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Neoliberalism, Inequalities and Social 
Movements in the European Union1
Abstract
The paper discusses the growing literature on the interrelations 
between neoliberal policy and rising inequalities in the Europe-
an Union, and their impact to the growing social movements.  
The analysis shows that inequalities within the EU member sta-
tes and between them are the results of the current EU policy 
due to fostering marketization, trade liberalization, privatizati-
on and financialization at the expense of social, economic and 
political rights of the majority. This trend has induced social mo-
vements to campaign and advocate for social changes. These ci-
vil society networks share same position in demanding transfor-
mation of the current ‘market Europe’ into ‘social Europe’. Their 
proposals to counter economic difficulties are based on intro-
ducing transformative economies that ‘works for people’. They 
advocate for alternative economic models, prioritizing socioe-
conomic justice, gender justice, tax justice, food justice and en-
vironmental justice. Thus, their position is far from populist ‘ra-
dical right’. The analysis also shows that these social movement 
networks may constitute corrective to democracy.
Keywords: neoliberal policy, European inequalities, social Euro-
pe, social justice, European social  movements
Introduction
 On 17 November 2019, it was two years that the European 
Pillar of Social Rights was proclaimed by EU institutions and 
leaders in Gothenburg, Sweden (European Commission, 2019, 
15 November). Delivering on the Pillar was a shared political 
1   This work was supported by the Ministry of Education, Science and Tech-
nological Development of the Republic of Serbia [projects number 179023 
and 47010]. The projects were implemented by the Institute of Social Sci-
ences, Belgrade. 
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commitment reiterated by EU Heads of State and Government 
in their New Strategic Agenda 2019-2024. In her political guide-
lines, the new Commission President-elect Ursula von den Ley-
en committed to putting forward an action plan to fully imple-
ment the European Pillar on Social Rights as a part of the 
broader initiatives for an economy that works for the people. 
The 2019 European Semester focuses on the three areas of the 
Pillar: equal opportunities and access to the labour market, fair 
working conditions, and social protection and inclusion. In its 
resolution of 16 November 20172, the European Parliament 
considered combating inequalities as a lever to boost job cre-
ation and growth and affirmed that inequalities threaten the 
future of the European project and can damage trust the EU as 
an engine of social progress. In response to the demands of 
leftist parties, trade unions and social movements, the discus-
sion on the social dimension of Europe became the part of the 
broader debated around the Commission’s White Paper on the 
Future of Europe. The European Pillar of Social Rights has been 
proclaimed by the European Parliament, the Council and the Eu-
ropean Commission in 2017, at the Social Summit for Fair Jobs 
and Growth. 
On the other side, statistics and data report on rising in-
equalities within the member states and between them (Eu-
rostat, January 2019). The economic and social situation, and 
prospects for economic development are unequal. Several 
counties, mainly at the North, develop well, and other coun-
tries, mainly at the South, are countering economic difficulties, 
unemployment, debts and weak outlooks for economic and sta-
ble growth. In addition, the current trend of mass migration 
brings a lot of issues that the countries have to deal with. The 
Brexit has fuelled a wide debate about the future of the Euro-
pean Union. As a consequence of all these tendencies, a general 
sentiment of insecurity is shared by the people (Villain-Gandos-
si, 2017: 74). Recent years witness rising citizens’ discontent, 
Euroscepticism, the radical right and populism in many member 
2   European Parliament resolution resolution of 16 November 2017 on 
combating inequalities as a lever to boost job creation and growth 
(2016/2269(INI)) 
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states. The analysis of the result of the recent elections to the 
European Parliament in May 2019 indicates that large part of 
the vulnerable in society, those who have strong concerns 
about relative deprivation, and feel uncomfortable about the 
erosion of the welfare state and increased inequality, “are cast-
ing their votes in favour of Populist on the left (with their eco-
nomic perspective) and in particular on the right (with their 
more socio-cultural perspective” (Jun, 2019: 55). The causes of 
the rising Euroscepticism, populism and the radical right may be 
found in increasing discontent of the many with the EU policies, 
which also fuels social mobilization in the rise in different coun-
tries. 
This paper examines two hypotheses. The first one is that 
the increasing inequalities in the European Union, caused by the 
prevailing neoliberal policy, contributed to the growth of social 
movements across Europe. The second hypothesis examined is 
that these social movements, fuelled by the rising discontent of 
citizens, contributed to increasing Euroscepticism and the radi-
cal right. The applied methodology is based on the desk re-
search, review of the collected data, statistics, surveys, research, 
literature and reports, and the qualitative analysis of the collect-
ed information. In this paper, neoliberalism is considered as a 
state strategy / policy, in order to distinguish this term as an ide-
ology and as a process. The objective of this paper is to point 
out the main findings of the analysis.
European inequalities
Over the last decade, inequality within member states has 
become much researched issue (Dauderstäd, 2017, 17 May). Its 
reducing is a target the European Union has set itself in its trea-
ties and monitors through its cohesion reports (European Com-
mission). In 2017, median equivalized net income varied consid-
erably across the EU member states, ranging from purchasing 
power standards (PPS) 5.239 in Romania to PPS 28.820 in Lux-
embourg. The EU-28 average was PPS 16.748 (Eurostat, January 
2019). Median equivalized net income fell, in real terms, in 2 out 
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of the 28 EU member states in 2017 — they were Sweden and 
Belgium. 
Official statistics show that no substantial worsening 
have been observed; however, this applies only to relative in-
equality, which indicates the income of richer people, regions 
and countries as a multiple of that of poorer ones (Dauderstädt 
& Keltek, 2017). In their comprehensive study on inequality in 
Europe, Dauderstädt & Keltek (2017: 2) have concluded that it 
was relatively stable, and absolutely alarming: “If one looks at 
the absolute differences between the higher and the lowest in-
comes, an alarming increase in inequality is to be observed in 
Europe”. This increasing trend of the European inequality is the 
result of changes in income distribution within and between 
the countries; inequality between member states is higher than 
inequality within them (Dauderstädt and Keltek, 2017: 3). Even 
in traditionally egalitarian countries – such as Germany, Den-
mark and Sweden – the income gap between rich and poor is 
expanding – from 5 to 1 in the 1980s to 6 to 1 today (OECD, 
2011: 1). Dauderstädt (2017, 19 April) further explains that Eu-
ropean inequality has not two, but three dimensions: within 
member states, between member states, and in the European 
Union altogether. 
Statistics on living conditions show growing income in-
equality. Across all 28 EU Member States, the top 20 % of the 
population with the highest national net disposable incomes 
(the top quintile) accounted for at least one third of total in-
come, a share that rose highest to 46.0 % in Bulgaria in 2017. 
By contrast, the bottom 20 % of the population with the lowest 
incomes together accounted for less than one tenth of all in-
come, except in Czechia (10.3 %) and Finland (10.0 %). Luxem-
bourg recorded the biggest fall in income share (-1.4 %) (Eu-
rostat, January 2019). Statistics indicate that social transfers, 
the main instrument for the realization of welfare policies, 
played a major role by helping to reduce income inequalities. In 
2017, social transfers reduced income inequality among the EU-
28 population: the Gini coefficient for income (including pen-
sions) was 51.7 % before social transfers and fell to 30.7 % af-
ter taking account of these transfers (Eurostat, January 2019). 
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The impact of pensions and other social transfers on income in-
equality was particularly large in Portugal, Greece, Germany and 
Sweden.
The comprehensive study of Blanchet, Chancel and Geth-
in (2019: 58)  also shows that as a result of a limited conver-
gence process and rising inequality within countries, Europeans 
are more unequal today than four decades ago. Between 1980 
and 2017, per adult average annual pre-tax income growth was 
below 1% for bottom 50% earners, while the top 0.1% grew at a 
rate higher than 2% per year. The top 1% captured about as 
much growth as the bottom 50% of the population. 
Social networks (ATTAC) claim that the European ‘debt’ 
crisis is basically not the result of government spendthrifts, inef-
ficient bureaucracy or whatever else is produced as an explana-
tion but is the result of an extreme disparity of existing wealth, 
and of a system that continuously intensifies these disparities. 
While public indebtedness is increasing, the private wealth con-
tinues to grow in value.
The figures indicate that private wealth grows faster than 
workers’ income. According to the data of the European ATTAC 
Network (2013, 22 March), in 2011 the private wealth in the Eu-
ropean Union amounted to 69.5 trillion euros. The private 
wealth is highly concentrated. The richest 1% of European soci-
ety hold more than 30% of it, while the poorer half of the soci-
ety has more or less nothing. Almost 142 million Europeans (out 
of around 500 million) are at risk of poverty (Dauderstädt, 2019, 
15 January). National poverty rates vary between over 25% in 
Romania and less than 10% in the Czech Republic. The official 
Eurostat figure for the EU as a whole is 17.3%. However, if a 
proper poverty threshold is calculated, the figure comes out sig-
nificantly higher, at 28.2 %. 
Intra-country inequality is increased by welfare cuts, la-
bour market deregulation and globalization. Inter-country in-
equality is rooted in complex causes with historical, social, po-
litical and economic dimensions. And inter-country inequality is 
higher than inequality within them. Compared at exchange 
rates, the average per capita income of the richest countries is 
10 times as high as in the poorest. And even more dramatic pic-
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ture of absolute inequality emerges if ones compares the aver-
age per capita income of the richest national quintile and the 
poorest national quintile. As data indicates, the richest nation-
al quintile is that of Luxembourg, with an annual income of al-
most 74.000 euros at exchange rates. The poorest quintile is 
that of Romania with an annual income of only 685 euros. The 
ration is more than 1 to 100 at exchange rates. Probably the 
most important consequence is the high emigration from the 
poorer EU member states to the richer ones. Countries such as 
Romania, Lithuania and Latvia have lost about 10 % of their 
population. In the receiving countries, immigration has bol-
stered national- populist tendencies. Many researchers warn 
that the dynamics of inequality gives little prospect of reduc-
ing absolute inequality in the future. The recent drop in Eu-
rope’s poverty and inequality rates is a welcome break from 
the stagnation of the preceding years. But, given the vast scale 
of the problem, which is underestimated in official figures, 
Dauderstädt and Keltek (2018: 4) estimates that it represents 
far too small a step in the right direction, and that “more deci-
sive policies will be needed if the disintegration of Europe is to 
be prevented”.
Inequality is particularly present in the peasant agricul-
ture. In agricultural work small farmers are the majority. Only 
2.7% of the total farms are large ones of more than 100 ha. 
They control 50% of the total agricultural land in the European 
Union, but Eurostat data show that they produce only 11% of 
total agricultural outputs. The remaining half amount of land is 
shared among 97% of farmers (almost 12 million farms) (Euro-
pean Coordination Via Campesina, 2017, 19 July). Data show in-
equality regarding the distribution of the aid, as the main bene-
ficiaries of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) are large 
farms and big agrobusinesses. About 80% of the CAP aid goes 
to about 20% of EU farmers, those with the largest holdings 
(European Coordination Via Campesina, 2017, 19 July). As a 
consequence, small farmers’ income decreases, and one third 
of small farms have disappeared in the last decade because un-
able to survive. Meanwhile, land in the hands of large farms is 
increasing. Rural waged workers, women, migrants and youth 
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are among the most negatively affected by current adverse ag-
ricultural policies. 
The comprehensive study published in 2013 (Franco and 
Borras, 2013) shows that Europe is experiencing tremendous 
and rapid land concentration, adversely affecting the livelihoods 
of millions of small-scale farmers and agricultural workers. 
Against these trends and in favour of alternatives, cross-class 
people’s movement is growing. On the basis of the case studies 
in the Member States, the authors of the study conclude that 
there is a need for an agrarian reform in Europe, as well as to re-
vise and reform the CAP due to the role it plays in fostering land 
concentration and an unsustainable agricultural model (Franco 
and Borras, 2013: 233). Civil society calls for real alternatives to 
the current model based on sustainable production of food 
through peasant agriculture, equitable access to land, with a 
particular focus on marginalised groups, and the sustainable use 
of natural resources. 
The researchers for the EU-funded GINI project also say 
that growing inequality in Europe is a problem (European Com-
mission, 2014, 2 June). The researchers have also found that in 
countries with higher income inequality, the poor tend to be 
less politically involved – meaning their interests are not well 
represented in democratic decision making. “The research 
shows that the best performers among rich countries in terms 
of employment, economic and social cohesion have in common 
a large welfare state that invests in people,” says GINI project 
coordinator Wiemer Salverda (European Commission, 2014, 2 
June). On the other hand, increasing income for a few and 
greater concentration of wealth in their hands means more po-
litical influence for the rich. This is a danger to democracy and a 
major concern. The conclusion of the GINI project is that as in-
equality increases, political participation tends to fall among 
those who are at the bottom in terms of earnings, while the rich 
tend to have a bigger influence on policy. 
Despite the number of projects and papers relevant to di-
versifying inequality (European Commission), and despite eco-
nomic recovery and decreasing unemployment, this issue is still 
at stake. At the thematic plenary debate in the European Parlia-
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ment about socio-economic inequalities on 6 February 2018, it 
was highlighted that “clearly, the neoliberal myth of trick-
le-down economics is not going to sort out the situation, […] 
The growing gap between the rich and the poor is undermining 
the social and democratic fabric of our societies. It is high time 
to act now” (EAPN, 2018, 7 February).
Neoliberal policy and the European Union
Many scholars (Milanovic, 2016; Milanovic, 2017, 1 De-
cember; Varoufakis, 2016; Dauderstädt and Keltek, 2017; Don-
ald & Martens, 2018) argue that the accelerated accumulation of 
private assets and the associated rise in wealth inequality is a 
major determinant of the global and EU crisis, and it is also con-
tinuing in the midst of the crisis. 
The inequalities accelerated aftermath the global eco-
nomic and financial crisis in 2008. Social movements and net-
works (ATTAC, 2013, 22 March) indicate that it is completely un-
acceptable for the costs of the crisis to be imposed mainly on 
those who had nothing to do with creating it. While banks are 
being saved with trillions of euros, and private wealth remains 
untouched, large sections of the population are confronted with 
massive decreases of living standards. The policy of cuts and 
austerities makes matters even worse. ATTAC warned that no-
body ever succeeded in getting out of a debt crisis by cutting 
spending. It will not work this time, either, since the spending 
cuts are causing a deep recession and intensifying the crisis. The 
economies of Portugal and Spain have both shrunk by 6.5% 
since 2007. The Greek economy has shrunk by more than 20%, 
and the outlook is even worse. The study on the national re-
sponses to the financial crisis in 2008 in the Central European 
Countries (Dokmanovic, 2017: 89) shows that they were “fo-
cused on saving the banking system and the big capital, socializ-
ing the risks for the wealthy, while privatizing the risks for the 
majority”. 
The trend of increasing inequalities has not emerged acci-
dentally, ‘but is the result of deliberately policy choices’ (Donald 
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& Martens, 2018: 41). The policy choices that have produced 
these inequalities in the EU are the same that have produced 
emerging inequalities at the global scale; namely, market con-
centration, corporate concentration, and financial capital con-
centration. Moreover, these choices have been rooted in and 
bolstered by the prevailing neoliberal policy. 
The key pillars of the neoliberal agenda are free trade and 
free unrestricted capital mobility, monetary restraint, and bud-
getary austerity; the ‘flexibilization’ of labour markets, the free 
movement of labour and the repression of wage demands; the 
privatization of public companies and services, as well as the re-
structuring of welfare states. These principles have been quite 
central to the idea of the European Union. The major policy is-
sues, such as the Single Market Strategy, European competition 
policy, Economic and Monetary Integration, and even the Euro-
pean Employment Strategy, have enhanced free trade and free 
capital mobility, monetary restraint and budgetary austerity, the 
flexibilization of labour markets, and the erosion of employment 
security. 
In his paper “Neoliberalism in the European Union”, Her-
mann (2007) demonstrates that the European integration pro-
cess was used to adopt mainstream neoliberal policies. The 
Schuman Plan and the foundation of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) were initially inspired by the notion of 
coordination and cooperation, rather than market-mediated 
competition. The EU has been created by the interest of the big 
businesses, and in fact, it is still managed by the interest of the 
big businesses. The Treaty of Rome created an institutional 
framework and laid the foundation for the establishment of the 
Single European Market and the adoption of the Single Europe-
an Act in 1986. The single European market was a response to 
the economic crisis after national therapies had largely failed. 
The unification of European markets was a demand from the Eu-
ropean Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) — an organization 
that assembles and represents Europe’s most powerful corpora-
tions. The common market has thus become a neoliberal market 
characterized by weak regulations or even deregulation. With 
the weakening of national regulations, barriers to entry for 
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non-European corporations were also minimized. Since 1990, ‘in-
dividual EU member states have unilaterally abolished over six-
ty-three hundred quantitative restrictions against imports from 
third countries’ (Hanson, according Hermann, 2007: 72).   
Hermann explains that the creation of the Single Market 
advanced intra-European competition, which, according to liber-
alization advocates, would strengthen European businesses and 
benefit consumers, because monopolistic firms or oligopolistic 
cartels can no longer use their economic dominance to distort 
market pricing. In the period of good time, until the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, the wealth and the profit have been distributed less 
or more on the fairer basis, securing social welfare for the ma-
jority. However, the costs of the 2008 crisis have been imposed 
on the majority. The implemented policies delivered austerity 
for many and socialism for the few. 
 Besides, the most important factor in driving the con-
centration of wealth has been the adoption of more regressive 
tax policies, with increased reliance on indirect taxes, declining 
corporate and personal income rates on the highest earners. 
Meanwhile, expenditures on public services and social protec-
tion have been cut back. These policies have always fallen dis-
proportionately on those who can least afford to pay. The gen-
der impact of the austerity measures is well-documented 
(Karamessini & Rubery, 2014; Durbin, Page & Walby, 2017; Con-
ley, 2012; Dokmanovic, 2017: 81-88; Dokmanovic, 2017a: 48-57). 
The liberalization of public services gained momentum in 
the early 1990s, demanding the liberalization of telecommunica-
tions, electricity, postal services and gas. The EU Member States 
have created large public sectors in the post-war years to 
achieve a broader influence in the economy beyond monetary 
and tax policies (Hermann, 2007: 74). The expansion of public 
services played a special role in the post-war expansion of Euro-
pean welfare states. It created not only employment opportuni-
ties for women, but also aided them to combine paid work with 
care duties and family responsibilities. 
There was a fundamental belief running through all these 
provisions that the liberalisation of these sectors will create 
competition, and that that would benefit consumers. However, 
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it showed that this consumer-oriented action presented a lucra-
tive business opportunity for private capital. Whereas the EU 
countries previously had publicly owned monopolies, now they 
have “politically created multinational private oligopolies.” (Hall, 
according Hermann, 2007: 76).
The employment has become a major policy issue with 
the Treaty of Amsterdam. The first set of employment policies 
adopted in 1997 specified employability, entrepreneurship, 
adaptability, and equal opportunity as the four main pillars of 
the European employment strategy. It now constitutes the part 
of the Europe 2020 Growth Strategy. While the European Em-
ployment Strategy is of great importance to maintain sufficient 
support for market and monetary integration, job outcomes 
have been moderate at best. Employment guidelines have been 
used to decrease employment protection and standards, and to 
flexibilize labour markets and labour regulation (Hermann, 2007: 
83). The integration process allowed policymakers, backed by 
the leading players of European capital, to erode the social 
rights that were achieved in the post-war decades. The integra-
tion has given the priority to competition and monetary issues 
at the expense of social demands. The structural imbalance has 
been created, which gives priority to economic over social and 
other issues. 
Macartney (2011) in his book Variegated Neoliberalism de-
mystifies the process of neoliberalisation focusing on the Euro-
pean case study and on EU financial market integration in the 
post-2000 era. He noticed that that period witnessed a new de-
gree of impetus in neoliberal reform, with over forty directives 
aimed at integrating financial markets, as it is based on a fi-
nance-led mode of accumulation. Macartney explains the EU in-
tegration as driven by capitalism’s accumulation imperative. The 
neoliberal shift which occurred after the financial crisis was an 
attempt to restore the class power of sections of the capitalist 
class over European working classes (Harvey, according Macart-
ney, 2011: 11). The neoliberal policy is based on economic 
growth as an ultimate goal. Economic development is measured 
by the level of the economic growth and the GDP, but monetary 
incomes do not constitute the wholeness of the human liveli-
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hood. The real purpose of economic development, improving 
the livelihoods of the people, is neglected. As a result, “in many 
countries, economic growth has not been translated into human 
development” (Dokmanovic, 2017a: 24). Under these circum-
stances, many are losing opportunity to participate in deci-
sion-making and to control their own space and resources, that 
contributes to rising economic, social and political insecurities 
(Op. cit., : 26).
Notwithstanding, in contrast to the widespread percep-
tion of European distinctiveness, Europe shares with other re-
gions of the world the same outcome where neoliberal restruc-
turing has been put into effect: “there has been a major 
redistribution of wealth from work contingent income to owner-
ship-contingent income” (Hermann, 2007: 86).
Despite extensive academic scholarship about the neolib-
eral nature of the process of the European integration, there is 
still a debate about the nature of the European neoliberalism. 
Birch and Mykhnenko (2009) do not assume that neoliberal inte-
gration has homogenization effects. They rather argue that neo-
liberalisation as a process has produced varieties of neoliberal-
ism across the European regions and not one hegemonic form 
of capitalism. On the other hand, Abrahamson (2010) argues 
that neoliberalism in the form of the so-called Washington con-
sensus is no longer promoted from the perspective of the late 
2000s, and that we are now beyond neoliberalism. This author 
considers that social policies are no longer regarded as a burden 
on economies, but rather as an investment in human capital.
Social Movements: Eurosceptics or Alter-Europeanists
Rising inequalities and decreasing the social welfare state 
have fuelled discontent of many citizens, as well as their fall of 
trust in the EU. Factors such as support for austerity and the mi-
gration issue have caused growing Euroscepticism, mistrust to-
wards the EU institutions, and thinking about alternative, visions 
of Europe “from below”. Due to the lack of space, this paper 
analysis the activities and policy demands solely those social 
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movements which are grass-rooted, have established network 
based on associated members in at least ten EU member states, 
have established institutional structure and are active in the de-
bate on the EU policies and future at regional and European lev-
el. Under these criteria, the following European networks atti-
tudes towards the European Union have been examined: 
ATTAC3, the European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN)4, the So-
cial Platform5, the Tax Justice Europe6, the European Network 
on Debt and Development (Eurodad)7, the European Coordina-
3   ATTAC, the ‘Association pour la Taxation des Transactions financière et 
l’Aide aux Citoyens’ (Association for the Taxation of financial Transac-
tions and Aid to Citizens) was founded in France in December 1998 af-
ter the publication in the Monde Diplomatique of an editorial entitled 
‘Désarmer les marchés’ (Disarm the markets) that launched the notion 
of creating an association to promote the Tobin tax. The organization 
expanded rapidly into the Europe and the rest of the world with an 
ATTAC network that is today active in some 40 countries with numer-
ous local groups and organizations supporting the network. IN Europe, 
ATTAC network is active in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Nor-
way, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and UK. See: ATTAC, 
ATTAC in Europe, https://www.attac.org/en/attac-europe (accessed 20 
May 2019). 
4    The largest European network of national, regional and local networks, 
involving anti-poverty NGOs and grassroot groups as well as European 
organizations, active in the fight against poverty and social exclusion. It 
was established in 1990. EAPN has consultative status with the Council 
of Europe. https://www.eapn.eu (Accessed 19 May 2019).
5   The largest network of European rights- and value-based civil society orga-
nization’s working in the social sector. Its areas of focus include building So-
cial Europe and advocating for a comprehensive implementation approach 
to the European Pillar of Social Rights. https://www.socialplatform.org (Ac-
cessed 19 May 2019).
6   European network, part of the Global Alliance for Tax Justice, a grow-
ing movement of civil society organizations and activists, including trade 
unions, united in campaigning for greater transparency, democratic over-
sight and redistribution of wealth in national and global tax systems. 
https://www.globaltaxjustice.org (Accessed 20 May 2019).
7   A network of 50 civil society organizations  from 20 European countries 
existing since 1990. Eurodad works for transformative yet specific changes 
to global and European policies, institutions, rules and structures to ensure 
a democratically controlled, environmentally sustainable financial and eco-
nomic system that works to eradicate poverty and ensure human rights for 
all. https://eurodad.org (Accessed 20 May 2019).
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tion Via Campesina8, Friends of the Earth Europe9, Alter Sum-
mit10 and Women in Development Europe+ (WIDE+)11. 
The hypothesis that these social movements contributed 
to increasing Euroscepticism and radical right is examined by the 
following methods: desk research and collecting data, informa-
tion, publications, reports and research available on their web-
sites, and a qualitative analysis of the collected information. The 
research was focused on identifying their mission, core values, 
areas of work, themes in the focus of work and research, and ad-
vocacy activities at the level of the European Union.
The social movements include the labour movement, re-
gional movements, the environmental movement, feminist 
movement, and the anti-nuclear movement. There are many of 
them being active at European, national and local level in bring-
ing citizens’ voices at the public and political fora. 
The key finding of the research is that, despite differenc-
es regarding the main topic they are dealing with (labour rights, 
social security, gender in development, peasants’ rights, eradica-
tion of poverty, economic development, environmental protec-
tion, food sovereignty, etc.), they share many same characteris-
tics, such as: 
·  All these networks share similar mission in opposing neo-
liberal policy.
8   The network is a part of the international peasants’ movement La Via Cam-
pesina fighting for food sovereignty, peasants’ rights, agroecology, dignity 
for migrants and waged workers in rural areas, environmental justice and 
international solidarity. https://viacampesina.org/en/ (Accessed 10 May 
2019).
9   The largest grassroots environmental network in Europe, uniting more 
than 30 national organisations with thousands of local groups. http://www.
foeeurope.org (Accessed 20 May 2019).
10   A network made up of feminist, antiracist and citizens’ movements as well 
as trade unions and campaign groups from over twenty European coun-
tries, opposing austerity policies implemented by EU Institutions. http://
www.altersummit.eu (Accessed 20 May 2019).
11   A European network of associations and activists that fights for women’s 
rights, as part of a larger struggle for social justice, sustainable livelihoods 
and human rights. https://wideplus.org (Accessed 10 May 2019).
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·  Their demands are focusing on social and economic 
changes.
·  They are active in searching, formulating and proposing 
social and policy interventions that may produce desired 
social and economic changes.
·  They share same values that are in the core of their work 
and advocacy efforts, and they are: protection and fulfil-
ment of economic, social, political, civil and cultural 
rights, equity, equality, gender equality, protection of 
vulnerable groups, labour rights, fair distribution of in-
come and profit, social security, North-South solidarity, 
international solidarity, people’s sovereignty, democrati-
zation of decision-making processes at all level, just 
trade, fair production, fair wages, protection of environ-
ment and natural resources, sustainable livelihoods, reg-
ulated markets and supply, corporate responsibility.
·  Their approach to the current economic, financial, social 
and environmental crisis is based on demanding justice 
(social justice, food justice, gender justice, tax justice 
and environmental justice).
·  They have developed and are working to develop further 
alternative models to the neoliberal policies that would 
put people and the environment at the centre of the 
economy and contribute social justice and sustainable 
livelihoods. 
·  They are active in advocacy for their demands before the 
EU institutions.
·  They have developed a valuable and vast source of 
knowledge through research, including participatory, 
multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary research. 
·  They address the EU’s democratic deficit demanding civil 
dialogue. 
·  They are active in the debate on the future of the Euro-
pean Union and Europe. 
Majority of these European movements are members of a 
global network and/or have taken active role in the global al-
ter-globalization movement, the World Social Forum and the Eu-
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ropean Social Forum. They colaborate with each other and sup-
port each other in campaigning, advocacy and research. They 
also cooperate with similar civil society organizations and net-
works in coutries outside the European Union. A number of their 
projects and activities has received the support of the European 
Commission. 
These above-mentioned findings support the conclusions 
of the Donatella Della Porta that contemporary European social 
movement organisations are to be defining as “critical Europe-
anists” instead of Eurosceptics (Della Porta, 2006). They are dis-
satisfied with the current economic policy and criticise neoliber-
alisation, marketization and privatization, but they seek for and 
offer alternatives based on research and empirical information. 
Their solutions are based on transformative economies, such as 
social economy, solidarity economy, feminist economy, and 
transformative practices, such as food sovereignty, agroecology, 
fair trade, financial transaction tax, regulation of financial mar-
kets, gender just trade policy, entitlement of communities and 
local producers, debts cancelling, and redistributive land reform. 
These models are based on new collective rights promoted from 
grassroots such as right to seed, right to food sovereignty, right 
to culturally appropriate food, and right to maintain, control and 
protect traditional knowledge. 
Social movement advocacy for transformative policies of 
the European Commission that would enhance economies and 
eliminate inequalities. These demands have been introduced to 
the forthcoming European Parliament elections in May 2019 as a 
‘Manifesto for a Sustainable Europe for its Citizens’ (Friends of 
the Earth Europe, 2018, 25 September).12 Similarly, the Alter 
Summit network has called for establishing a political, social and 
democratic Europe, building on the basis of equality, solidarity 
and genuine democracy (Alter Summit, 2019). For example, af-
termath the EU elections in May 2019, 37 social movement orga-
nizations called for EU food policy and European Commission 
12   On this occasion, Jagoda Munic, director of Friends of the Earth Europe, 
said: “At the moment too much of the debate about the future of Europe 
is stuck in the question of ‘more or less EU?’. We need to move the conver-
sation on to ‘what kind of Europe do we want?’. 
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Vice-President for Food for ensuring the sustainability of the Eu-
ropean food systems (Friends of the Earth Europe, 2019, 17 
July). These networks are also united in insisting the implemen-
tation of the European Pillar of Social Rights and the Agenda 
2030.  At the 2nd Social Platform Flagship Conference in Helsinki, 
in September 2019, the recommendations have been developed 
for an economy of wellbeing approach that leaves no one be-
hind. The economy of wellbeing encompasses a long-term ap-
proach ‘that looks at the impact of decisions and policies on 
people’s lives, is based on a participatory governance structure, 
and ensures socioeconomic and environmental justice for all’ 
(Social Platform, 2019, 24 September). 
They also call for involvement of civil society organisa-
tions in all stages of the EU decision-making process to ensure 
decision are based on the impact they have on people’s lives. Re-
cently, the 2nd Social Platform Flagship Conference has called 
the future Executive Vice-President of the European Commis-
sion for ‘An Economy that Works for People’ to go beyond en-
gaging only in social dialogue and to establish a structured rela-
tionship with civil society organisations (Social Platform, 2019, 
24 September).
Conclusions
The findings of this paper confirm the first hypothesis ex-
amined, that the increasing inequalities in the European Union, 
caused by the prevailing neoliberal policy, contributed to the 
rise of social movements across Europe. The hypothesis that 
these social movements contributed to increasing Euroscepti-
cism and radical right has been refuted. The demands of these 
civil society networks, as well as their advocacy efforts, are ori-
ented to transform current ‘market Europe’ into ‘social Europe’. 
They use social pressure for system change. They insist in having 
a permanent dialogue and a structured relationship with the EU 
institutions, but they do not tend to transform themselves insti-
tutionally in a form of a political party. They stay focused on ex-
amining and proposing alternatives to counter current economic 
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and social difficulties, calling for social justice. Thus, their posi-
tion is more on the ‘left’ side than the ‘right’. Instead of being 
Eurosceptics, members of social movements are rather Eurocriti-
cals and Alter-Europeanists demanding for a more sustainable, 
inclusive and democratic Europe. Although there is still a schol-
arly debate about the European dimension of these movements 
and the nature of contemporary collective action (Mathers, 
2016), apparently, they may constitute corrective to strengthen-
ing democracy.
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